Intellect or Insanity, Jonathan Klinger's Blog

0. Abstract.

[This Wednesday I shall lecture at the LiSS working group conference, here is a draft of my lecture] From 2003, and until today, the Israeli Government has been working diligently in order to legislate the biometric database act and the orders and ordinances according to it. However, This biometric database is not the only biometric database in Israel and is not the only database where government authorities have access to. In my brief lecture, I shall present a different approach, asking whether this database act was actually required and what are the reasons for choosing a legislative act when doing so. When doing so, I’ll have to ask whether the act of legislation was needed because the social contract was broken, or because it was a megalomaniac act made out in will to block any different approach to databases.

1. Database Laws, Privacy.

Let’s first understand how government databases operate. The Israeli Privacy Protection Act does not differentiate public sector databases from private sector ones; moreover, article 23D provides any person the right to know about such database and article 23C provides government bodies the right to request and transfer data from other databases when the action is required by law or by the body’s function. Meaning, if it was it’s desire, the Government could have set up a registered database and operated the biometric database out of such act; but in such case, it couldn’t have mandated the people to provide their biometric information.

So what could it do? It could have amended the Census Act. The Israeli Census Act is the act regulating the management of the Israeli Census (which, as we already know, was leaked to the Internet); article 2 writes down the fields in the database that are required to be listed. In such case, amending and mandating a person’s biometric data under it could have solved the biometric database problem in a 1-line amendment, without requiring massive legislation.

However, The Israeli legislator decided to pass a 30 page long act (PDF), which describes in full the security and use in detail, and allow public debate over it. In order to understand why, let’s understand how other government databases work.

2. Government Databases and legislation.

First let’s see what are the databases which were legislated and which weren’t; Meir Sheetrit, the biometric database’s entrepreneur, said that “Israel has enough [other] biometric databases“. However, if we inspect his claims, we find out a different perspective; the one who says who and when is required to provide his information willfully to the database.

Let’s first inspect what are the databases that were legislated under the Israeli Law: The Israeli Anti-Money Laundering Act, The Israeli Census Act (which actually does not establish a database, but only allows the inquiry of information), The Police DNA Database (The Criminal Procedure Act (Searching in a person’s body and taking of identifying information)), Criminal Records (The Criminal Record Act).

On the other hand, there are quite a lot of databases which contain information which is as personal and as sensitive as the legislated databases, including the migrant workers biometric database, the driver’s license database which includes photographs and according to the Israeli transportation office, does not require legislation in order to retain a database (where the transportation office provides this biometric information at least to the ministry of interior), the unemployed database, which contains fingerprints of unemployed and  the Bus Authority database that contains information regarding passengers and their routes.

3. Why do you legislate databases?

We can see that while some databases were legislated because of their sensitive nature (money laundering, f.e), there is no actual difference between the sensitivity; There is no actual difference between money laundering information or the biometrics of a migrant worker. We can also say that legislation did not come because of the voluntary nature of the database; a person cannot choose to be unemployed or not to travel by car or bus. None of the non-legislated databases are actually voluntary; they just address specific needs and puts the person “agreeing” to provide the information in an inferior place: he is either unemployed, or he wishes to travel to Israeli to work, he may want to drive in Israel or take a bus. These are all daily functions that a person cannot go without.

4. Why Legislation.

Now, let’s go to the theoretical assumption that legislating the biometric database could have been made without any real or substantial legislation; It could have actually just establish a national database by issuing an order of the Passport Act, seeing that most Israelies have a passport, and hold the information in a way that is “required” to issue a passport; he could have went in the same way the Transportation Office went, and required just the issuance of fingerprints. However, the choice to legislate the database was taken. And why?

The reason is the Israeli Privacy Protection Act, but not the article requiring willful consent, nor the article mandating informing the data subject on its rights, but because of article 23C. Let’s inspect the text:

“Notwithstanding article 23b, providing the information is permitted, if not prohibited by any legislation or professional ethics – (1) between public bodies, if one of the following exists (a) providing the information is in the authority or role of the body who provides the data and it is required to exercise a law or a cause by the authority of the data provider or its recipient; (b) providing the database is to a public body who is allowed to demand such information according to law from any other source; (2) from a public body to a government office or another state establishment, or between offices or bodies as such, if the providing of information is required to exercise any legislation or for a purpose in the authority or roles of the data provider or its recipient …”

Well, we do need to read this carefully: There could have been a state-wide database without legislation;  however, in such case the Police could not have been granted access to the information. And why? because neither article 23b(a)(i) nor article 23b(a)(ii) allow it: The first alternative requires specific authorization under law to disclose the information and the second requires that the police would have been authorized to request the information at source. However, the police are not entitled to coerce a person to give them his biometric information, and the ministry of interior [was] not authorized to specifically assist the police.

Therefore, unlike other databases, the mobility of the information and the detachment between the cause of why it was collected and its use brought the actual need for legislation.

5. Ruling out other factors.

Now, we can inquire about the question of whether this was actually the reason; whether there was a secret hand that required it. The only reason to explain why a 30-page long bill was passed was explained when alternatives were presented to the government. The rejection of the Adi Shamir proposal, for a non-identifiable database, and the choice to store both a person’s facial photo and fingerprint (where such information is not required to maintain a clean database, see Yoram Oren’s statement “if the purpose is to reduce a list, then yes“). Meaning, the legislator was presented with at least two alternatives that allow a secure database that does not allow double-inclusion and does not retain so much sensitive data, but rejected it.

Such rejection may be discussed later in courts when inquiring about the constitutionality of the act, but that’ out of the point. The choice of both legislating and deciding on this architecture was made solely in order to allow surveillance.

6. Summary and Conclusions.

We know that the legislator had other options to legislate a database (or not to legislate it); and that it could have allowed it to be used quicker, without any pilot and even with the coercion against the persons, but in such case, the police and other security authorities could not have obtained access to the database. Therefore, the sole purpose of addressing legislation is in order to allow such access, and unless we can rule this out, this is the true purpose of the database.

A rumor was spread that Israel was the brain behind an elaborate trojan horse, Stuxnet, which alegedly penetrated into the Iranian nuclear reactor and apparently caused damage. the trojan horse contaminated some civil facilities as well. The trojan horse, which utilizes no less than four different zero-day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows seems interesting and elaborate. However, the alleged involvement of Israel, alongside the claim that civilian facilities were damaged in the act, raise one interesting question: Could there be electronic war crimes?

The Public International Law, which bases the humane treatment to civilians in the different Geneva Conventions, sets the standards to use in times of war and defines acts prohibited by states in order to keep wars as civil as possible. The different conventions limit force and sanctions against civilians, but do those treaties and conventions apply on electronic warfare?

Prima facia, article 53 to the fourth Geneva Convention which deals in protecting civilians in times of war states that “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations“. However, the fourth convention applies only, in this article, to occupied territories (Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic, Mario Cerkez). In contrast, the 1977 protocol amended and added to article 51 and stated that “Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:those which are not directed at a specific military objective; “. Meaning that an electronic attack against civilian property that couldn’t discriminate between military and civilian facilities are prohibited (However, most states have not adopted the 1977 protocol).

Jack Goldsmith states that the inability to determine which computers are military and which are civilian may protect the use of computer viruses in electronic warfare, but I reckon the other way around: In the same way that indiscriminate shooting against innocent civilians is a war crime, so is using a trojan horse that does not differ civilian and military computers. The indiscriminate use is as prohibited as the use of chemical weapons which cannot discriminate civilians and soldiers. It is not a coincidence that the terminology is the same: computer or biological viruses.

And what about the civil liability? Theoretically, the state immunity (and liability) should be limited in times of war (and see, in IsraelThe Act of Civil Torts (State Liability) 1952) and the state should not be liable for acts where the state protected itself; however, this doctrine should not be used in cases where civil damage arose when the state knew, should have known and forseen the damage (HCJ 8276/05Adallah v. Minister of Defense). Therefore, the civilian casualties in Israel’s alleged cyber-attack should have liability against it.

Intellectual Property laws have more than a few political implications; many times issues of political speech interfere with copyright. For example, Shepard Fairey, an artist who authored the famous “Hope” poster for Barack Obama, was sought by the Associated Press for copyright infringement as the image of Obama was based on a copyrighted photo (and in Israel, a the Supreme Court will soon hear a similar case, RCA 7774/09 Weinberg v. Weisshoff, where the Defendant is sought for copying a photo the Plaintiff took into a coin made in memory of the assassinated prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin). In another case, the US Senate candidate, Sharon Angle is sought by the proprietors of rights to newspaper articles for presenting copies of the articles which she appeared in, on her personal website and there are more cases; mostly, these cases are borderline in relation to copyright protection, but they are classical monetary suits, not political.

In contrast, the story which was spread on the press during the last few days was not less surprising, but at least ended in an interesting manner. Two days ago, the New York Times reported that the Russian government and police use copyright laws in order to supress political dissidents. The system worked as follows: The Russian police used its granted authority to enforce copyright laws in a violent manner (and it did so in the past, where it sent a school principal to prison for using unauthorized copies of Microsoft Windows) and claimed that copies of Microsoft Windows installed on the dissident organization’s computers are unlicensed (pirated – jk); In Russia, where the unlicensed software rates are only second to the Israeli conviction rates by a person’s confession, it is more than likely that a political organization will use unauthorized software>.

First, it was reported that Microsoft encouraged the enforcement as a part of its zero-tolerance to copyright infringement policy; however, after suffering from damage to its public image, apparently, it decidedto reform its licensing policy, so that a general license will be granted to non-profits in order to protect them from political pursuit. In a post published by Brad Smith, Microsoft Senior VP and Counsel, he explained that Microsoft could not be a part of this and must take an ethical stand.

The claim may be true, but it could also reflect a wise business approach. Until today, Microsoft profited from unlicensed use in 3rd world countries. Microsoft also knows that if raids like this will continue, dissidents will stop using Windows and move to open source software, and primarily Linux, in one distribution or another. Moving to Linux is unilateral, it changes a person’s point of view: from organization that were dependent of a specific software to a part of a larger community; Most organization who hear about open source are enchanted by it, they have an option to donate, contribute, change, share information and not just run the program.

Moreover, Privacy Enhancing Technologies are more available on open source operating systems. From the EXT4 file system which comes by default in Ubuntu and encrypts your hard drives (similar to Microsoft’s BitLocker, but it just works), through TOR servers who reduce censorship: Open Source is the new heaven of dissidents.

Therefore, Microsoft’s blanket license comes to heal a small shallow scratch, not the problem: Copyrights are ill, and Microsoft took the right way to take care of it: acknowledging that non-profit use is fair and allowed. However, until further technologies, innovative ones, will protect dissidents, the raids will continue. Today it’s the operating system, tomorrow, the word processor, afterwards? image editing programs.

0.
Around two days ago, Israeli ISPs began to block access to certain websites from Israel. The list of the websites is considered confidential, and included, by media reports two websites related to gambling. The issue in matter began around two months ago, when the Israeli police, alongside the tax authorities arrested 28 suspects who were suspected in collaborating with two websites: Stan James and Victor Chandler. Following a brief period of time, the police approached the Israeli ISPs in request to block access to those sites claiming it has the authority to do so by clause 229 to the Israeli Penal Code. Though they had not had a court order, the commander of the police district interpreted his authority enacted in the act, which is defined as “The Chief of a police district may order the closing down of a place where prohibited gaming, raffles or gambling is taking place” as such which governs also the realm of IP addresses and Internet Service Providers. However, up to this moment no ISP has challenged this authority in court.

1.
First, to the question of whether the police actually has jurisdiction according to clause 229 (and see Adv Ori Goldman‘s opinion on the matter); In two cases the courts heard cases which are similar, though none had to face clause 229. The first was the Carlton Case (CR 90861/07 Michael Gary Carlton v. Israeli Police, Dr. Omer Tene‘s explanation on Carlton) where the Israeli police requested to detain a foreign national who was involved in the operation of the Victor Chandler website (blocked now). Carlton stated that as the website does not operate from Israel, the Israeli law does not apply to acts performed outside of Israel by non-Israelites. The court denied the claim, and asserted that Carlton’s acts were illegal as “In light of the fact, that the appellant has the ability to identify the place of the end-user, prior to registering to the website, the appellant and his company’s blind-sight is material. It is expressed by the fact that while they are aware that gambling is prohibited in Israel, and by greed, knowing that the Israeli public is profitable to the company, they do not act in order to block access to Israel“. The other case is related to blocking a file sharing website by request of the record companies (OCR 3485/08 NMC v. Eli Amar. However, the Amar decision was not a reasoned one, but a brief consensual decision.

2.
As a general rule, the Israeli courts ruled that actions which are available to Israelites are under their jurisdiction and the Israeli criminal law may be applied on any activities. However, where the authority under clause 229 applies remain unanswered by Israeli courts, as the supreme court has yet to rule on the interpretation of the matter, without relation to the Internet, and lower courts ruled regarding the clause without actual discussion on the cases, and approved warrants as a matter of habit without discussing constitutional right. In one rare case, the court observed the infringement of constitutional rights (AA (Jer)1666/09 Salima Kazam v. Israeli Police) and explained that the court is too extensive: The police chief has a rare authority to issue, based on administrative ex-parte evidence, a closing warrant which is permanent and constitutional human rights, both a person’s right for freedom of employment according to Basic Law of Freedom of Employment and his right for property according to clause 2 to the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Freedom. This is performed in the same place where the court, even after convicting a person in possession or managing a place of unlawful gaming according to clause 228 to the penal act, may only fine or incarcerate the person“. The court emphasized the personal manner of the warrant, and human rights, even after rejecting the request to quash it. However, in another case, the court ruled that “the warrant is to close a place, it goes with the place and is applied on the place without regards to who operates his business in such place. changes in the identity of the person who operates the place do not affect it … a warrant could be issued even without personal names, where you do not know who operates the place. The warrant has in rem applicability” (AA (Haifa) 538/02 Romach Trade Co. v. Zevulun Police).

3.
However, in one case the district court interpreted the rationale behind 229, where it ruled, interpreting the Supereme Court’s ruling in RCA9140/99 Romano v. State that “The rationale behind the law’s foundations … is not detached from the law’s purpose, which is to rule out social plagues who endanger a person and society” (OCR (Tel-Aviv) 32354/03 Gilian Trade and Marketing v. Israeli Police). The purpose in issuing a 229 warrant was made to assist in preventing the negative impacts of gambling on society, such as criminal activities; the rule is, that the police may act only to enforce the law and not deter or punish (ACD 2316/95 Ganimat v. State, C (Krayot) 15336-01-10 State v. Amiaz); you cannot punish the proprietors of the place, its users and others from legitimate uses in the same way you cannot arrest a person as a penalty.

4.
Therefore, the requested conclusion is that when both gambling and non-gambling occur in a segregated manner, the legal activity cannot be closed down (AA 236/04 The 7th Heaven v. Israeli Police, where other courts ruled, strangely, that 229 is punitive or deterring, AA 1709/09 Amar Razam v. Jerusalem Chief of Police) and the gambling itself the police has to stop, where the collaborators have to be arrested. This conclusion arises from the same constitutional rights, including freedom of employment and right for property and dignity. The police’s authority could not be used to deter and cannot be directed towards activity which is not gambling. The police has to perform its acts in a responsible manner for the public. From here, we address the issue.

5.
First, the police did not act in accordance to its authority under 229: the warrant was not personal and was not addressed to the proprietor of the place, but solely to who provided access to it; a warrant to block websites served to an ISP is like providing the bus company a warrant to remove a bus station next to a gambling house. The ISP is not the proprietor, not the operator and is not the required party. As far as the police has claims against a website, it should address its operators even if they are outside of Israel and initiate criminal proceedings. If the police still believes that the Carlton decision is in force, then they are are free to act with accordance to it.

6.
Second, the warrant’s breath. The warrant, granted against the websites and IP addresses [See Hebrew Warrant] requested to block the website in full, even the parts not related to gambling. For example, if a person plays without waging a bet, solely in thePlay for Fun part of the website, then he is affected by the warrant without need. In such case, the warrant is not narrowly tailored in the means needed and affects constitutional rights. Moreover, providing a warrant against an IP address and a domain is considered equal to closing a shopping mall because one kiosk sells raffle tickets. In contrast to the Amar Razam decision, these are two distinct different groups of users, different communities and uses, and no need to block the play for fun.

7.
This means that we already began the slippery slope (which our ministry of communication rejected): some of the websites blocked are not gambling sites, but only facilitate funds; one case. of KeshCard.com, at least until proven otherwise, is a website for financial services and not gambling. The websites allows payment, amongst other things, for gambling, but is a financial service similar to others and is not different from credit cards; therefore, there is no reason to block it.

8.
Finally, it is quite difficult not to discuss the websites blocked. Though the police know about hundreds of sites, the two families blocked relate to a regulated market in Israel: sports booking. The Israeli Council for Sports Betting regulates and operates the market heavily, and the proximity to the World-Cup, where the Council’s earning skyrocketed, is strange. Moreover, the proximity to the Israeli Anti-Trust Authority’s decision to consider pressing charges against The Pais, Israel’s second licensed gambling operation, after suspicion arose that it entered into a restraining agreement where the Israeli Association for the Soldier which is licensed to act as well, where ISA shall not engage in raffles, against a material donation from The Pais. Moreover, The Pais offered more money to be provided to the country for more gambling rights, and even to pay salaries in local municipalities, and has previously offered to assist the police financially in the struggle against unlawful gambling.

9.
In conclusion, it is quite obvious the censorship could not stand; in order to drop it, a person using KeshCard or plays VC with “Play for fun” (meaning a person who was hurt by the warrant) shall appeal against the censorship to a court. The ISPs forgot what is the public interest they are meant to protect, and the ministry of communication, who’s authority was run over in one police warrant, does nothing.

[Material Comment: I am writing this without the consent or knowledge of any of my clients, and it does not reflect my opinion or any legal review I provided them]

[Originally in Hebrew]

0. Abstract
Could a state with no secrets function better when protecting national security than a state that keeps information away from the general public? In this brief article, we will inspect the reasons for keeping classified information, what they are meant to protect and how they protect national security. We will present the method used by Israel, which is similar to most states. Israel’s approach, which is to keep all the information from the public, failed in general and caused nothing but costs on privacy, freedom of expression and national budgets.

Following our review, we will compare the classified information model to a model in information security, called Security through Obscurity and present how this model was perceived as flawed. Against it, we will present the Open Source Model, which creates transparency towards the general public, allowing it to inspect the security flaws, and therefore creates stronger protection.

Our conclusion would be that better national security could be reached by removing all classified information and disclosing all information to the general public. We believe that by making the information public, the cost of the censorship apparatus will be eliminated. We also believe that by adopting a ‘no classified information’ approach, governments may improve physical security when they rely on the foundations of open source security as detailed herein.

In my brief argumentation I will use the Israeli law, but provide some examples from other cases.

1. Classified Information and what it Protects.
Every state has its secrets. States choose, in certain cases to classify information from the general public. Classifying information goes back as far as Greek times, and goes under the standard four categories: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted. Israel has four apparatuses which are in charge of Confidential information: The Information Security Department, whose goal is to prevent classified information from leaking from the army, The Military Censorship, which operates under the Defense Ordinance (Time of Emergency), 1945, that controls media publication and telecommunication, and has authority to refuse the publication of any information that has any relation to national security, the General Security Service (Shin Bet) that acts according to the General Security Service Act of 2002, where clause 7(2) allows the service to classify documents and determine how to handle such documents and the Director of Security of the Defense Establishment, which is in charge of security in military industries, research facilities and other national security industries.

Some authorities in classifying information do not appear to exist in laws, and some operate under the vague and broad exemption added in the Freedom of Information Act, 1998. Clause 9 to the Israeli FOIA exempts disclosure of any information which may harm national security, foreign relations, public safety or a person’s well-being. Even in cases where classified information was disclosed, the courts still allowed the security agencies broad discretion as to what to blur out (HCJ 258/07 Zehava Galon v. The Governmental Committee for Inspecting the Battles in Lebanon 2006)

But what constitutes as confidential information? There are no actual guidelines for applying what is confidential and how confidential specific documents are, and every document that contains ‘information’ as defined in the Israeli Penal Code, in part II, chapter 7, the Penal code provides a broad definition, inflicting legal sanctions on disclosing any information to an enemy where it might be useful to him (clause 111). Confidential Information is defined as any information where national security requires keeping it secret, or information relating to any matter that the government, with the consent of the parliament committee for foreign relations and security, declared as confidential. Critics to this arrangement offered an amendment, but following the Parliament’s research center’s comments, these amendments were not implemented.

The burden of proving what constitutes non-confidential information lays on the defendants in cases (see, for example, CC 1055/01 State v. Yacov), in Yacov, the court explained that while “the military censor is qualified to strike out information which is most-likely about to severely damage national security”; the penal code is wider, and applies to cases where national security requires keeping it secret.

In another interesting case, the widow of a person who worked in the nuclear research facility requested to receive the results of an epidemiological survey between the facility’s workers which the facility took. The State declined to provide the information by explaining that it relates to national security. However, when the court rejected the state claims, it expressed criticism over the state’s conduct: “the state wiggles in its arguments and cannot point to a normative authority where it draws the classification of the information. It is, according to the state, basic foundations, but these basic foundations have to be applied by the General Security Service Act, 2002, and the rules according to it (which are classified, so the state cannot disclose them to the court, but as a graceful act the state is willing to summarize them)” (CA (Tel-Aviv) 2571/01 Hanna Hizi v. State ); the court itself explained that it cannot understand classification, and the state has to acknowledge the differences between confidentiality and classification. Classification does not create basis for exclusion of evidence, and unless the state decides to exclude an evidence by means of national security according to the Evidence Act, 1971. However, in cases where the court finds the evidence may have had something to assist the party who wishes to submit the evidence, then the state shall default (OCR 2489/09 Zeev Braude v. State).

The Israeli Supreme Court deal with the question of what constitutes classified information in Vanunu (CA 172/88 Mordechai Vanunu v. State); in Vanunu, a former worker of the nuclear research facility was charged for espionage when he disclosed information regarding Israel’s nuclear activity to press agents in the UK. The supreme court decided to convict Vanunu for collecting and disseminating information to the enemy. The court analyzed this clause and explained that “He who provides information to the enemy; meaning, any information, even if it is public information arising from the press, his activities fall into clause 111”. Therefore eliminating classification need at all.

What Does Classified Information Protect? The question of what classified information protects is a difficult one to answer. Some claim that the purpose of classifying information is withholding it from foreign agents, and explain that when many people have access to certain information, it harms national security. Classifying information makes it harder for counter intelligence and foreign military forces to obtain information regarding a state’s forces, and allows it to operate where the other party does not know its rules of engagement, its powers, officers, or even defense mechanisms.

But the real question is how much this information, used by foreign intelligence,  endangers national security , and does the burden of protecting this information overcome the value of keeping it secret or not.

When the classified information is the actual secret (e.g the actual location or time of a specific operation) then it is assumed (though not significant) that information about the operation that becomes available to hostile forces may lead to less successful results, at least. There are specific sets of information that are considered confidential and are not pieces of information that have (statistically insignificant) connection to current, ongoing operations or other information that if leaked may cause damage to national security.

For example, the actual existence of a specific weapon or the location where a missile fell after an air-strike cannot be considered a state secret for several reasons: the first is that it is not kept away from the public; as what the general public sees cannot be considered national secrets. For example, during the 2006 war, the military censorship requested Tapuz, Israel’s largest forum operator, to censor posts made by civilians about where Hizbullah missiles fell. Another case  where information that is in the public’s plain view was considered confidential was when Parliament Member Yossi Sarid threatened that he may disclose information about weapons used by the IAF after the IAF killed and wounded dozens of Palestinians, including civilians, in weapons that were allegedly in plain view.

Another case where public plain viewed information was considered confidential was when Israel denied using phosphorous during the Cast Lead Operation of 2009, where the evidence was left in the Gaza Strip, which allowed the Goldstone committee, which inspected Israel’s activity following the operation, to find that Israel’s denial was false. So, in this case, how could the use of phosphorous be considered confidential information where there is evidence in plain view regarding the use?

Therefore, confidential information could be considered confidential as long as no public information regarding it exists. For example, the location of specific military or nuclear facilities that are located close by to cities and have road signs directing to them, could not be considered confidential information. Israeli Blogger Ido Kenan points out that Israel has a policy of withholding this confidential information in road signs presented in Arabic, and leave the confidential information only in Hebrew and English.

In conclusion, classified information in Israel is defined in an overbroad manner, containing information that may be considered in plain view and known to the general public. By acknowledging this flaw, we may understand the basis of information security and examine the weak points of such method of information security.

We believe that there has to be a difference between the classification of security mechanisms by themselves and information (data) which relates to specific, mission critical, information that is classified. The difference is between information regarding the existence and functions of a specific unit, its weapons , its history, and current plans regarding  an operation.

2. Security By Obscurity, A Problem
2.1 Security By Obscurity
When trying to protect information in a digital environment, there are two popular methods used by Information Security experts. The first is Security through Obscurity: this method, which is quite similar to the Israeli Classified Information method or approach, hides all information related to security from plain view and classified it as confidential; by using this method, “a system relying on security through obscurity may have theoretical or actual security vulnerabilities, but its owners or designers believe that the flaws are not known, and that attackers are unlikely to find them”. The model bases itself on the fact that others are unaware of the activities taken and that most confidential activities could be disguised from plain view.

However, the flaws of this model are that the secrecy of the information is exactly what lets security flaws to remain secret as well. For example, GSM encryption was hacked during 2003, and again during 2009. These hacks were published to the public because they were a part of academic researches; however, in certain cases the hacker may not be so eager to publish its research. In some cases, employees or contractors may sell known exploits which were not taken care of and criminals may sell unknown exploits either to other criminals or to the company itself. Moreover, relying on a sole provider to fix the security breach could sometimes cause more problems.

The main disadvantages of Security through Obscurity may be summed up to: (1) few people inspect the system for flaws, and sometimes actually inspecting the system may be considered illegal; (2) hostile entities reviewing the security of the system do not disclose their results; (3) dependency on one vendor/provider to review and fix security breaches.

2.2 The Open Source Model.
In contrast to Security through Obscurity, Open Source advocates rely heavily on Security Through Transparency, using this method, the algorithms and software used to encrypt or protect information are known to the public, providing the public an efficient way to report security vulnerabilities, and even to propose bug-fixes. The more people have the chance to inspect the security mechanism, the safer they will be.

For example, Security firm Secunia found that more security flaws were found in the Open Sourced Firefox than in proprietary code browsers, but the number of Zero-Day unpatched flaws was significantly lower and so was the time that it took to fix any flaw. By making all of its information public, a software vendor may create better security and allow any researcher to discover flaws. Moreover, transparent security mechanisms may also deter hackers from looking how to circumvent zero day flaws in fear of being caught (See aso, David Wheeler, “Is Open Source Good for Security?”).

The Open Source Model does not ignore the basic concepts of information security, but it acknowledges their flaws and attempts to build better models.

3. Could Building a Transparent State Solve National Security?
Could we imagine a state where all public information could be deemed as non-confidential, security mechanisms would be public and open for scrutiny and confidential information would be reduced to a minimum? We believe so.

Currently, a state like Israel has to operate counter intelligence just to solve the problem of collection of plain-view information and to protect from hostile action. When operating an open source model, counter-intelligence could be abandoned and replaced with crowd sourced models, which will help to build stronger mechanisms of protection.

Moreover, removing the ambiguity relating at-least to nuclear weapons in Israel would assist deterrence and strengthen national security. Weak points  in Israeli theoretical protection would be visible to the public and could be fixed quickly; moreover, the actual items that require protection could receive the needed funds and resources to protect them.

3.1 What is there to lose from revealing all classified information?
While we do not necessarily wish to reveal all information, certain information relating to means of operation and security regulations have to be declassified. For example, both the General Security Services Act and the recent Inclusion of Biometric Information and Data in Identification Documents and Database Act of 2009 state that all regulation and orders will be classified, as well as any information regarding security breaches. Moreover, when discussing the act in Parliament, security experts raised concerns over the database possible flaws, and the Minister of Interior, Eli Yishai, ordered to open the security protocols for discussion, but such discussion was never made. Keeping the database, as well as security guidelines and notifications of security breaches secret seems good in the eye of a person who thinks that an enemy may abuse such faults; however in the eyes of a security researcher, these allow zero day flaws and known vulnerabilities to be used against the database  (see, for example) and allows a false feeling of security.

The only thing that may be lost when protocols, orders or regulations that remain secret are disclosed is the misconduct of an authority or its acts against the law; for example, as a result of Israel’s Freedom of Information Movement’s appeal, it was revealed that the cellular companies were required to adhere to secret regulation regarding cooperation with intelligence agencies and disclose subscriber information.

Therefore, when the governmental default approach is that there is no need for privacy unless a person has something to hide from the government (which seems to be the default approach when discussing the Israeli government, as the Biometric Database Act, the Criminal Order (Submission of Metadata) Act of 2007, and other statutes turning Israel into a surveillance state) then the default approach towards the government should be that all its secrets are meant to cover up unlawful activities.

3.2 What is there to gain from revealing all classified information?
First and foremost, the Israeli Government may regain public trust by disclosing all activities. The Israeli public, for example, strongly believes that the Biometric Database will leak, mostly due to the fact that quite a lot of sensitive data has  already leaked from Government databases and that 70% of the general public does not trust database protection in Israel. A different survey by Symantec found that 60% of the people do not trust the government with their private or personal information.

The feeling of misused trust may be healed and cured when disclosing information regarding data breaches and information security to the public. But more than that, apart from public trust, the government may gain better protection of its classified information. The Israeli government may adopt what computer giants like Google and 3Com already did, and that is to pay for every security breach found.

Currently Israel has many unknown security flaws, which remain confidential until a hacker gets caught. For example, Israeli white-hat hacker Moshe Halevi (Halemo) was charged for hacking when he used a pre-paid credit card to show that the Israeli Fines and Fees Center had a bug in the URL handler that allowed resetting a person’s fines. In a detailed case (C 9497/08 State v. Moshe Halevi) Judge Avraham Tenenbaum explains why Halemo’s activity was not hacking, but was solely security checking (a similar case, CA 8333/03 State v. Mizrachi, explains that port-scanning cannot be criminal if done for a cause of security inspection). Therefore, we can argue that the state has a compelling interest to discover flaws.

3.3 The state’s approach to security flaws.
However, we see that in most cases the state prefers to withhold information from the public regarding security flaws and to litigate against persons discovering such flaws. Moreover, when flaws are found, usually adopting the Security through Obscurity approach shows that the way the state fixes the vulnerability is not only insufficient, but negligent.

In one case, white-hat hacker Halemo discovered that the Israeli Court System’s website discloses Judge’s ID Numbers (equivalent to Social Security numbers). The way it disclosed them was that the URL Source of the Judge’s page in the website was his ID number. After the flaw was exposed, the state went to fix the flaw, and replaced the ID with a Base-64 representation of the number.

However, if we require the state to disclose its means of security it would have to disclose how the judges ID numbers were encrypted or protected, and therefore every person would have understood that neither plain-text nor base-64 are good enough mechanisms to protect sensitive information.

4. Applying Software Solutions to State Secrets: A Conclusion.
We believe that not all information has to be public. There are things that are better off secret. However, if we learn from information security methods, we must acknowledge that better security could be achieved when disclosing more information to the public. Applying the open source model of information security allows transparency in decision-making, better algorithms, less resources on counter-intelligence and more resources to allocate to what is mission critical information.

Moreover, better trust could be gained between governments and citizens, reinforcing the social contract and allowing better results in political participation.

Currently, governments over trust security through obscurity when operating mission critical processes, and therefore, when flawed, the flaws and results are enormous. Utilizing open source models could prevent mishaps such as Israel’s phosphorous use, George Bush’s Weapons of Mass Destruction lie and Israel’s racial profiling in Airports as a mean of security.

Israeli racial profiling is such a great example, as it is highly efficient nowadays and even better than the US TSA guidelines but bases itself mostly on the assumption that Jewish nationals may not be considered a threat to national security but Arabs may (HCJ 4797/07 The Israeli Association of Civil Rights v. The Terminal Security Authority, Pending decision). As long as the security guidelines were secret, it seemed amazing that no security flaw occurred. However, now, that the guidelines are known and understood, it is easier to design a mechanism to circumvent them. Therefore, even adopting new guidelines will be useless, as they are inefficient (unless based, again, on racial profiling).

Therefore, in order to regain national security, Israel will have to change its approach to the Open Source Model before a major security event occurs that will make it understand that this is the only option. Staying in a Security through Obscurity approach could protect confidential information, but it cannot protect national security.

The Israeli Supreme Court ruled on February that the clause in the Israeli Criminal Procedure Act which allows ex-parte court hearings for suspects in terror or national security crimes was unconstitutional and void (OCR 8823/07 Doe v. State). In the same case, the supreme court balanced between the burden of a democratic state has to face when facing terror within and due process and ruled that a suspect’s right for due process prevails as it is what makes Israel a democratic state:

Harming those who can’t defend from their arrest either by personal appearance or by ‘representative educated appearance’ is a material violation of human rights. it may annul the process and make the legal process void. … When an attorney did not meet the suspect, and the court is prevented as well from asking the suspect and inquiring about matters that need clearing, there is an actual burden on the possibility of exercising efficient and fair legal review. The court, in fact, relies on the statements of one party only. This result is grave in regards to the character of the legal due process and the matter is discussion – limiting a person’s freedom”.

In a same manner, clause 34 to the criminal procedure act states that the right to consult an attorney is one of the basics of due process; without decent representation a person will not have actual knowledge of his rights, will not have his day in court and therefore, any violation of this right, even if indirect, may cause damages to the legal process itself (and see, for this matter, HCJ 1548/07 Israel Bar v. Minister of Homeland Security which discusses the right to consult an attorney via video conference). However, foreign sources report that Israel has, again, not only violated the law, but kept covering it up. According to foreign sources, The Israeli-Arab author Ameer Makhoul was arrested in suspicion of committing crimes against national security and was prevented from meeting his attorney (and thanks to Yossi Gurvitz from Friends of George who referred me to this story). According to the reports, Makoul was prohibited from leaving Israel a month ago by the Minister of Interior Affairs, Eli Yishai, and that was against specific stipulations in Israel’s Basic Statute of Freedom and Dignity which states that “every person is free to exist Israel”.

Two problems come to mind when thinking about this, if it were actually true; the first is that now no one knows what Makhoul is a suspect of. his disappearance by the security services was not reported in the press, and we were not given any information, as a public, as to what he is suspected of. What actually happened is that the public trust that if it were taken by the dead of night for now reason, his friends, acquaintances, family and attorneys would know about it was lost due to the serial disappearance drawn by the government for dissidents. The graver danger in these cases, and cases such as deprevation of Jack Titel‘s right to consult an attorney, is that the damages to the due process would be irreversible. Not only that the public trust would be gone, but a person would not be able to evaluate in an educated manner what to do and sometimes is willing to do anything just to make the torture go away (and see RT 3032/99 Baranes v. State and HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government).

The seconds problem is the gag orders; if in the Anat Kamm affair there were confused bloggers who couldn’t understand how to deal with unknown gag orders, when they understood that the Israeli Police does not want to enforce the gag order on Facebook since its servers are outside of Israel (and that’s in spite of the decision in OR 90861//7 Carlton v. State which ruled that “hiding under the veil that the company operates and runs outside of Israel, its servers are not in the state, does not exempt the appellant and the company he heads from the Israeli criminal law”). But it seems that the police and secret services do not wish for gag orders to become a dead letter and will just ignore the bloggers, and let the farce play in the national media.

No matter how you look at it, the arrest of dissidents and their disappearance does not fit Israel’s character as a Jewish-Democratic state.

Whilst I, as an Israeli citizen and national, cannot discuss what is known throughout the globe as the Israel’s censorship scandal, I can at least say that we can learn that Israel is not alone. Israeli courts, apparently, issued a gag order against reporting on a case relating to security measures, but that’s all I might have been allowed to state had the gag order was available to my hand.

However, Israel learned from it’s greatest friend: The United States was quite militant in fighting Wikileaks, a website dedicated to unveil corruption and unjustice, which was already involved in discovering money laundering schemes and (was taken off the web in a court order on Julius Bael v. Wilileaks). There was a reason why the US wanted Wikileaks off the web, as it is now known that Wikileaks published a video showing the US military forces in Iraq killing journalists (Available here).

But there are a few more similarities between the US and Israel. Israel also, as detailed in Uri Blau’s report from November 2008, was killing wanted Hamas militants instead of arresting them, against the supreme court’s decision and in contradiction to the law. However, the Israeli generals who disobeyed the Israeli law will never be brought to justice.

“I don’t think that there are many tragedies in China and there are no serious problems in china as long as you don’t fuck with the government“; that’s what John Perry Barlow said when Ido Kenan, Jonathan Silber and I interviewed him on August 2007. Barlow was enchanted by china so much that it seemed to forget that we have an inherent right to fuck with our government.

However, if you see Hillary Clinton‘s attack on China which marks the shot for the next world wide war, the war on information freedom, you need to think twice. Indeed, the alleged actions by China were hideous. Entering into a dissident’s email account and exploing zero-day vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer (the same browser that the Israeli Government requires people to use in order to interact with it) and Adobe’s Acrobat Reader is no less than troubling. However, Clinton’s rage on the involvement, censorship of political websites that try to undermine the government and reading personal emails was that it was blocking free trade. Therefore, China’s response was no less obvious: China reckons that Clinton (and Google) should obey the local laws, which include China’s ability to monitor and enforce the net.

Whether Clinton (and Google) are right, and whether China is right, one should still see Clinton’s hypocrisy.

During the same week where the United States decides to pick on China, we discover that the FBI made warrentless surveillance and obtained data illegally claiming that these activities were made against terror suspects. The US also performs warrantless and causeless searches in laptops when crossing the US border, copies their content and violates the privacy of those who enter the US, and even without need for cause. Meaning, the United States’ conduct is no different than China; The only difference is that the US performs this due to rules and regulations and China hacks.

“It is easier for the United States to point at China and say that they have a human-rights problem than to look at themselves”, Barlow said. But the Democracy residing in Zion is not innocent. When we blame China and stand next to our greatest friend we have to remember what Israel has been doing during the last year. Just last year we buried the Internet Censorship act, and now a new bill by Danny Danon threatens the freedom of the net, where the bill, if passed, will allow the Israeli government to shut down websites harming the Government’s stability, or sites which risk national security. More than that, the MetaData act in Israel allows the same crimes we blame China: our phone and Internet providers must provide the government with details about their users.

Israel already addmitted searching Mordechai Vanunun‘s computer when violating the law and tapping his emails; the same actions China made and is being blamed for; we just call these actions “National Security”

[Originally Posted in Hebrew on TheMarkerIT]

The Government’s wish to issue self-signed electronic signatures on the newly inaugurated biometric cards is more of a monetary mishap than a privacy Issue. However, some critics may say that this is more than a failure, it’s a way of doing business.

In 2001, Israel legislated an Electronic Signature Act, which allowed authorised bodies to issue digital signatures to encrypt and digitally sign documents, in order to replace their physical presence [further reading at the Israel Justice Department website]. To sum up: when acquiring a digital signature, a certificate authority issues a signature, and then validates your identity and warrants that you are who you say you are.

However, due mostly to overburden created by the state, Israel holds only one certificate authority, ComSign. The problem? ComSign is (a) a private company and (b) charges 300 ILS (~75 US$) per signature. The lack of competition caused the government to try a new approach: as every biometric ID has to be digitally signed, the government wishes to be both the certificate authority and the entity which relies on the validty. There are two main advantages for this scheme: first, the costs of issuing electronic ID cards reduce, as there is only need to pay the issuer of the plastic card; Second, the government is certain that the certificate authority will never go out of business.

However, there is one major flaw: when the government issues a person’s private key, it can never (and i mean never) hold a copy of that private key. Exposing this key to any person which may be able to access it is a major flaw that could assist identity theft and other causes. Here comes the need for a certificate authority’s liability. When inflicting liability on a CA, it may exercise best care and warrant that no information may be misused. Moreover, it, by itself, lacks the interest of infringing its users’ privacy. Therefore, opening the market to competition and allowing more private CAs is the solution, not allowing the government to have more force.

However, a minor tongue-slip by Adi Sagi, from the military’s CA, during last week’s discussion, may show that something is not all-that-ok wiith a self-issuing certificate authority; Sagi stated that the certificate exists “not only on service cards, but also for Keva [additional service, after the mandatory - jk], soldier service cards, smart ID cards for the military’s needs. I want to raise two other points: the first is the trust in the soldiers or loss of cards. Once a soldier loses a smart card or a card is stolen, he has to notify the police and the ministry of interior that the card was stolen. Then you need to operate systems where the certificate is not valid anymore and a new certificate needs to be issued. I don’t know, and i guess that Boaz [Dolev, the head of the computing unit in the government - jk] doesn’t know, any authority that if a certificate is stolen may…” here Sagi was interrupted, stating that he exceeded his authority.

But it seems that the architecture of privacy here was not in the main interest of the government. Issuing seven milion ID cards and paying a private entity 300 ILS per card may cost the government more than it is willing to pay for the biometric experiment. Therefore, the government decided, for monetary reasons to risk the citizens’ privacy, and be its own certificate authority.

When explaining it to the committee, i said that “I am afraid from my government. I am afraid from the government in a place where a corrupt social security employee was bribed to pass private information; I am afraind from a government that cannot investigate the leak of its own census; I am afraid from the government and I am entitled to do so, and it is still the government’s duty to protect me. But this is not the discussion. The question is a certificate authority could be the entity that verifies the identity and still hold my cryptographic keys“.

Something has to be done here, before it gets too late.

During the last few weeks I’ve been actively lobbying against the Biometric Database bill in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament). I participated in the hearing held in the Knesset’s Science Committee (participated by only one parliament member, Meir Sheetrit, the bill’s drafter) and tried to talk sense to the Ministry of Interior and the Parliament Member. However, it seems that if no drastic steps will be made, Israel will pass the biometric database bill next Monday.

A central biometric database, allowing access to the police and “other” authorities, including not only fingerprints but also facial scans (not just hashes) will allow CCTV monitoring and de-anonymization of most Israelies.

Should the database, somewhat leak, like Israel’s national census, it would be a target for criminals, terrorists and corporations, who now collect their own databases. The database itself may be a great danger to personal freedom, as the Israeli Public Defender states: “This kind of database, which would include identifying information about the general population, is unprecedented both in its existence and in its ramifications… No democracy has such a database, with the sole exception of Hong Kong.”

However, a recent finding by an Israeli Blogger and Lawyer, Effi Fuks, possibly links between the much too eager parliament member, Sheetrit and On Track Innovation (OTI), a company participating in  the Tender. According to Fuks’ findings, OTI has already won a tenderless project to operate public transportation smart-cards, when Sheetrit was the minister of transportation (and also promote his wife’s PR firm clients in teners) after his predecessor issued a tender for smart-cards. This alone would not suffice as a thread for corruption, however, OTI’s former VP of R&D, Sivan Yechieli, is a member of Sheetrit’s Party, Kadima, and now acts as the Mayor of Kfar Vradim.

Does that suffice? Sheetrit’s eagerness, banning photography and refusal for interviews all construct one logic: There must be something inherently wrong with the bill. Had Sheetrit had any previous connection to OTI, he must have stated so. Also, as Yechieli was elected as a mayor when Sheetrit was the minister of Interior, it is quite difficult not to have any knowledge about his previous employement and business. OTI spoke after the discussion ended, and only after it ended, and did not participate, unlike other participants, in the actual discussion, which seemed strange.

Yesterday, in the last discussion, after it was finalised that all authorities (including tax, immigration, health etcetera) will receive access to the photodatabase (a new non-biometric database of all citizen photos) I asked whether there’s a need for both fingerprints and photos, as one suffices in reaching the law’s purpose of identifying all Israelies and preventing false identities. The ministry of interior answered positively, but Sheetrit explained that The Law Must Go On.