Intellect or Insanity, Jonathan Klinger's Blog

The recent Australian decision in Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 3) [2010] FCA 24 was more than satisfactory to most of the users and Internet Service Providers. In summary, the Australian Federal Court ruled that an Internet Service Provider is not liable for its users’ copyright infringement as it does not encourage or authorise such downloads. iiNet was sought in court for enabling BitTorrent traffic and not barring its users from sharing files.

While the 200 page decision is more than interesting, one should note that the court had more than a challenge when needed to explain how BitTorrent actually infringes copyright. Copyright law has a requirement that the copying be of a substantial part of the work (s. 14, Australian Copyright Act). Therefore, a BitTorrent client, which provides small chunks of a file does not provide, copy or make available a substantial part, as any of the parts transferred may be irrelevant and insatisfactory in regards to copyright infringement (see more about BitTorrent at Stephen Knox, Diarmaid O’Cearuil, Nicola Scott Holland and Ljiljana Skrba, BitTorrent).

For example, sampling, such as in Girl Talk’s videos may sometimes be considered fair use, at least by the artist and it does not, at most times, sample a substantial part of the original work. BitTorrent, at least here, creates a material challenge to explain how a particular user copies a substantial part, as a user does not actually create a substantial copy. However, the court went on, and explain, in a rather meticulous way, how it sees BitTorrent as creating a copy of a substantial part of the work:

The Court finds that it is the wrong approach to focus on each individual piece of the file transmitted within the swarm as an individual example of an ‘electronic transmission’. The BitTorrent system does not exist outside of the aggregate effect of those transmissions, since a person seeks the whole of the file, not a piece of it. In short, BitTorrent is not the individual transmissions, it is the swarm. (…) The correct approach is to view the swarm as an entity in itself. The ‘electronic transmission’ act occurs between the iiNet user/peer and the swarm, not between each individual peer. One-on-one communications between peers is the technical process by which the data is transferred, but that does not mean that such level of detail is necessarily what the communication right in s 86(c) focuses upon.

Viewing the swarm as a copy of a work is an interesting initiative. It sits side-by-side with the legal problems which cloud computing may face, but the swarm is not an entity, it does not have a right for expression nor does it have an understanding of fair use, it cannot use legal defenses (such as the doctrine of first sale) in creating such copies and cannot be sanctioned monetarily. So who could be sought after?

Theoretically, let’s see a swarm for a popular .torrent, such as a movie: while some users may pirate content (according to a recent dubious study, the some is 99%), we can acknowledge that at least some of the people sharing a file have a good reason to do so. We can assume that at least a small portion actually bought the content and are downloading this copy as it is more comfortable to use on their computer (due to DRM restrictions, let’s say), some are actually selling their legal copy to a friend and using a private p2p .torrent to convey the first sale doctrine (Like Vernor v. Autodesk), some are conveying a copy as a fair use right, to create a derivative work in a research or for personal study of the work, and some are creating a digital archive or researching network behaviour.

Seeking out legal action against a swarm is problematic. You do not have an actual person which infringes, but a computer connected to a network; this computer could have been configured to automatically download content, for example, download automatically any popular movie using The Pirate Bay’s top 100, such download does not contain any human intervention and therefore is not an  act of infringement, as infringement has to be done by a real person.

Now, let’s assume that the person actually views the movie. At least the Israeli and US Copyright Acts do not contain a provision prohibiting use, just copying. So, theoretically, such automated mean may be exempt from copyright infringement for personal use. In this very improbable case, no copyright infringement occurs in the swarm, and the swarm may be a copy, but not a copyright infringement.

The research we conducted with Ynet News in regards to p2p throttling and DPI in Israel, which was (even after reading the criticism) most likely the most comprehensive in Israel, even though it needed more research. One of the results was a Parliamentary hearing by Meir Sheetrit, the chair of the Science & Technology Committee. The real question is what to do with it.

Daniel, one of the commentators in the Hebrew blog, claimed that a class action lawsuit could not be substantiated on contractual grounds. I disagree, but in spite of many calls and mails I received to launch a class-action, I’m not sure it’s the right thing to do. A class action may be filed according to the consumer protection act or based on other obligation. Allegedly, the ISPs obligation to net neutrality in their license (and see clause 5.4.1 to the general ISP license) and their obligations according to clause 29 to the Telecommunication Act are sufficient cause. The problem? The Class Action Act requires monetary damages, and there is more than one problem to prove it.

And what are things all about? If the cause of class action lawsuits is not to enrich the attorneys and plaintiff but to bring restitutional justice, then it will not be made; in the best case, a settlement would be made where the attorneys will receive 500K ILS and the plaintiff 1M ILS, where all the related clients will receive 10% bandwidth upgrades for a few months. Apart from that, even if different damages were made to different potential plaintiffs, there’s still place for class action lawsuits (OCR 31032/06 Shalom & Malka Fabrics v. Tel-Aviv). But what was the damage?

Many comments were written in wrath and required justice and a lawsuit. The problem, none of the commentators had any monetary damage. Is blocking a p2p download cause-worthy? Could those people come to the court in clean hands and explain to the judge what are the files they downloaded? Most likely, some lawyers’ will to be first just went up to their heads.

Of course, one should understand the difference between illegal file sharing and other interference that may occur in prioritizing VOIP traffic or blocking other services.

The people with the most to gain from this research, most likely, may be the Copyright Organizations. If we recap the discussions on the Electronic Commerce Bill around a year and a half ago, where the idea was that An ISP shall not be liable to acts committed by its users if it wasn’t aware of the activity and was not supposed to be aware, we understand the problem (See also Dubitsky v. Shabiro and MGM v. Grokster). Actually, ALIS, the Israeli equivalent of the MPAA could request the ISPs for damages, as they interfered with traffic and blocked. De-facto, this claim would not be far from the required legal conclusion: if the ISPs did not interfere with traffic, they were better of in regards to liability.

Therefore, if someone should sue the ISPs to bring restitutional justice, it should be the Copyright Holders. If they were actually harmed by file sharing (and I doubt they were), let them sue the ISPs and make them pay, understand and acknowledge that by blocking they inflicted liability on themselves. That way, and only that way, they’ll learn.

[Posted in Hebrew]